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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
constructed, the Oregon statute should serve as a guide to those in-
terested citizens seeking an end to litter and mounting solid waste.
Frederick A. Jesser, III
Labor Law-Employer Free Speech-Use of
the Gissel Guidelines in Determining
Predictions or Threats
The first amendment of the United States Constitution and
section 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act' (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the NLRA or the Act) guarantee to employers and
unions the right to freedom of speech. Questions concerning the ex-
tension of this right, however, provide a substantial field of litigation,
both before the National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the NLRB or the Board) and the federal courts.'
In 1941, the decision in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.3 recognized the employer's first amendment right of free speech.
That ruling "abolished the assumption that the employer's posi-
tion made his expressions in the organizing context coercive per
se . . . ."I The Board could continue to regulate employer speech,
but only as part of a totality of employer activity that "restrain[s]
or coerce [s] his employees in their free choice ....
129 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
2 Pokempner, Employer Free Speech Under The National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 25 MD. L. Rav. 111 (1965).
3 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
4 Note, Restrictions On the Employer's Right Of Free Speech During
Organizing Campaigns And Collective Bargaining, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 40, 44
(1968). Initially, the Board required employers to maintain strict neutrality.
"This approach was based on the belief that an employer's statements could
not be divorced from his position of economic power over his employees,
so that no matter how innocent the speech itself, the employees would be
under pressure to follow the express desire of their employer.' Id. at 43-44.
"The Board reasoned that the choice of a bargaining representative was the
workers' exclusive concern, in which the employer had no more interest than
the employees would have in participating in the choice of the company's
board of directors." A Cox & D. Bog, LABOR LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 170
(7th ed. 1969).
5 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). The
Court in remanding the case instructed the Board to examine the speech (and
bulletin posted by the employer appealing to employees to bargain with the
company directly) in the totality of the employer's conduct, taking account
of the surrounding circumstances, such as discriminatory discharges, acts of
hostility, and general employer opposition to unions, in determining whether
such speech was "coercive." Id. at 479-80.
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From the decision in Virginia Electric until the Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947, the Board continued to adhere in principle to
the "totality of conduct" approach.6 In 1947, Congress reaffirmed the
employer's right to comment on union organizational efforts by add-
ing subsection (c) to section 8 of the original Wagner Act:'
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic,
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this
Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefits.'
In order to find an unfair labor practice based on an employer's
expression, the Board must first find that such expression interfered
with, restrained or coerced the employees in the exercise of their
section 7 rights, including the right to form, join, or assist labor
organizations. "[T]he crux of the matter is not what is or is not
'free speech' but rather what is a threat of reprisal or force or prom-
ise of benefit."
Although it seems clear that Congress intended to broaden the
range of permissible employer communication, the NLRB in 1948, in
the General Shde Corp.' case, construed the section 8(c) language
literally, holding that it applied only to unfair labor practice cases
and not to representation cases. Thus the Board formulated a doc-
trine that employer speech, though privileged under section 8(c),
could be used to set aside an election, even though no part of the
speech could be found to constitute an unfair labor practice. Despite
this decision, the Board has usually evaluated the content of the em-
ployer's speech in terms of whether the speech itself exceeds the
section 8(c) privilege. If the content of the speech fails to exceed
the statutory limitations, the Board will then look to circumstances
surrounding the speech to determine if the effect was coercive. Only
on rare occasions has the Board set aside an election purely on
grounds of the content of an employer's speech which comes within
the section 8(c) privilege."
6 Pokempner, supra note 2, at 113.
7 See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
829 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1958).
9 Pokempner, supra note 2, at 112.10 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
11 See Miller-Charles & Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 405 (1964).
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The discussion here will be limited to just one of the most fre-
quent problem areas - employer predictions of the consequences of
unionization. Are his expressions actual "predictions," or are they
veiled threats of his course of action should the company become
unionized?
Both employers and unions have the right, within the limitations
of the NLRA, to communicate all relevant information to the em-
ployees so that they may make a knowledgeable, independent de-
cision of whether or not they wish to become unionized. Frequent
problems arise when the employer, during a pre-election campaign,
seeks to predict the effects of unionization on his company and to
express his legal position toward the union if it wins the election. The
pervading question is whether employer expressions constitute ac-
tual "predictions" of the consequences of unionization, or whether
they constitute hidden threats of his course of action when faced
with unionization.
By the early 1950's "the Board began to give greater latitude
to employer speeches .. ..", During the 1960's, Professors Cox
and Bok, among others, suggested that the prevailing rule (prohibit-
ing employer "threats" during organizational campaigns, but permit-
ting "predictions") unduly inhibited the employee's right to associ-
ate.'" It was suggested that "the power that the employer holds over
the livelihood of his employees ... which distinguishes him from the
ordinary speaker . . . justifies special limitations on his right to
communicate." 4 Bok further stated:
In principle, the policy was sound enough, for when the
employer simply pointed out the adverse consequences
which might lawfully result from unionization he provided
the employees with information that was clearly pertinent
to the decision they were called upon to make. In practice,
however, the policy gave hostile employers great leeway
to indulge in dire predictions in order to dissuade the em-
ployees from supporting the union."
12 A. Cox & D. BoK, supra note 4, at 176-77.
'
3 See A. Cox, LAw AND Tim NATIONAL LABOR POLicY 42-43 (1960);
Bok, The Regulation Of Campaign Tactics In Representation Elections Under
The National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 75 (1964). Both
writers made the point that the economic dependence of the employee
conditioned his reaction to the employer's words.
14 Bok, supra note 13, at 70.
151d. at 75.
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It was contended that it was difficult to administer the prohibi-
tion against predicting exaggerated or fabricated economic conse-
quences of unionization, such as plant shutdown or loss of business.
The factors involved in such predictions were often complex, con-
flicting, and speculative, and the ultimate decision was usually a
matter of subjective judgment. As a result, the Board could rarely
disprove the employer's predictions without an unjustifiable expen-
diture of agency resources.16
It was argued that the application of the "total context" ap-
proach in determining the coercive nature of employer statements
"places both unions and employers in a position of uncertainty as to
what may properly be said during the pre-election campaign," and
there was a need for "definite guidelines.""7
The United States Supreme Court made an apparent effort to
supply the needed guidelines in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 8 in
1969. Although the remedies adopted in Gissel differed somewhat
from those suggested by the critics, "[i]t seems demonstrable that
the applicable rules governing employer speech have been greatly
altered by that case."' 9
At the outset, the Court rejected the notion that an employer
during an organizational campaign is free to confront his employees
with the uninhibited, robust speech appropriate in other contexts.
"[I]n the context of a nascent union organizational drive . . ." the
Court held, "employers must be careful in waging their anti-union
campaign."20 It also stated that
[A]n employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rights
of the employees to associate freely . . . . And any bal-
ancing of those rights must take into account the economic
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the
necessary tendency of the former, because of that relation-
ship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that
1Id. at 81.
17 Cuneo, NLRB's Totality of Conduct Theory in Representation Elec-
tions and Problems Involved in its Application, 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 229, 238,
243-44 (1968).
18 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
9 Browne & Sachs, The Suppression Of Employer Free Speech - A
New Ban On "Conscious Overstatements" And A Caveat Against "Brink-
manship," 15 VYLL. L. REV. 588, 599 (1970).
20 395 U.S. at 616.
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might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested
ear."
2
,
The Court then formulated specific standards for evaluating
the impact of employer statements during an organizational cam-
paign. An employer may freely state "his general views about union-
ism or any of his specific views about a particular union.. ." subject
only to the general statutory limitation of "threat of reprisal or force
or promise of benefit."22
However, a stricter standard is applied to an employer's "pre-
diction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on
his company."23 Such predictions "must be carefully phrased on the
basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demon-
strably probable consequences beyond his control...."24
By requiring that the employer's prediction be based upon "ob-
jective facts," from which it appears that the predicted consequence
of unionization is "demonstrably probable," and one that is "beyond
[the employer's] control," the Court established clear, largely ob-
jective criteria that should assure that a permitted prediction reflects
the employer's bona fide judgment concerning the effects of unioni-
zation itself. The purpose of the additional requirement that the
prediction be "carefully phrased" to convey the employer's belief
is to assure that the hearer will know that the employer's statement
is a bona fide prediction and not a threat.25
The guidelines set forth in Gissel should provide assistance to
the Board and the courts in handling the problem of employer "pre-
dictions." However, like most guidelines, they are subject to vary-
ing interpretations. A look at several recent federal court decisions
illustrates the point that Gissel did not eliminate all of the confusion.
In NLRB v. Lenkurt Electric Co.,2" the court, refusing to en-
force the Board's order, held that an employer could predict unfav-
2 Id. at 617.
22Id. at 618.
231d.24 Id. (emphasis added). The Court added, "or to convey a management
decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization" to
provide for the special situation dealt with in Textile Workers Union v.
Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274, n. 20.
25 NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 1971)
(dissenting opinion).
26438 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1971). In conversations with the printing
department employees, employer's manager, Linka, suggested that if the
employees were to unionize, it was possible that a more strict regimentation
[Vol. 74
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orable consequences which it believed would result from unioniza-
tion. Such predictions had to have some reasonable basis of fact
and had to be in fact predictions, rather than veiled threats to retal-
iate against the employees should the union prevail.
The court based its decision upon Gissel, reading that decision
as establishing two standards by which an employer's statements
could be objectionable. "[A]n employer may not impliedly threaten
retaliatory consequences within his control, nor may he, in an excess
of imagination and under the guise of prediction, fabricate hobgoblin
consequences outside his control which have no basis in objective
fact."27
The court found nothing in the expressions of the company
supervisor constituting an express or implied threat of retaliatory
action by the company. In determining whether the employer's state-
ments constituted permissible argument or prohibited threats, the
statements were considered in the context of the factual situation in
which they were made, and in view of the totality of employer
conduct."
of working hours would be implemented. He said company policy with
respect to coffeee breaks, lunch hours and conversation while working had
been fairly casual in the printing department, while controls in the unionized
departments of the plant were much stricter. Linka also explained that if
they became unionized and the basis of compensation changed from monthly
salary to hourly rates, which were the basis of compensation of other union
employees in the plant, a more strict observance of working time might
result.
Linka further suggested that working conditions might be made more
difficult by unionization because the company might seek to reduce operating
costs by using less expensive paper stock in the printing department. The
use of lower quality stock might cause more problems for the operators of
the machines.
Linka also stated that sick leave and other fringe benefits, particularly
the policy of providing working smocks and laundry service to the employees,
might be changed by unionization. Such changes were described as potentially
necessary to reduce costs and remain competitive.
Two female employees were told that their lack of diversified experience
in operating the printing machines might work to their disadvantage in the
event of unionization. These women could only operate one or two
machines in the print shop. It had been company policy when the machines
they operated broke down or when work was slack to move these women
to other departments to complete their work day. Linka told them that
based on his observation of union shops, unions were adverse to temporary
transfer of employees outside of their primary department, and thus the
company might be unable to continue its past policy. It might become
necessary, if these women were unable to work in other departments, to
lay them off temporarily during periods when they were unable to work in
the printing department.271d. at 1106.
2'See NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941);
P. R. Mallory & Co. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1967).
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The court in Lenkurt found no background of anti-union ani-
mus on the part of the employer. The supervisor's statements were
held to be "predictions of possible disadvantages which might arise
from economic necessity or because of union demands or union
policies."29 It was also held that each of the challenged statements
was based on objective facts, and the supervisor's predictions were,
under all the circumstances, demonstrably probable consequences
which might be anticipated as the result of unionization. The majority
stated that the exercise of free speech in organizational compaigns
should not be unduly restricted by narrow construction. The court
felt it was most desirable that employees hear all sides of the ques-
tion in order that they could exercise an informed and reasoned
choice.
Judge Browning dissented in Lenkurt on the basis of the
United States Supreme Court holding in Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB."° In that case, the Court held that the Board's findings within
its field "carry the authority of expertness which courts do not possess
and therefore must respect."" He also cited Gissel for the proposition
that "a reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in
the first instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the con-
text of the employer-employee relationship."3 He felt that even "if
it were not within the Board's special competence to determine
whether [the supervisor's] statements conveyed an implied threat
to employees, it would still be improper for a reviewing court to dis-
place the Board's 'choice between two fairly conflicting views, even
though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had
the matter been bef6re it de novo.'"" The Board had concluded that
the supervisor's statements were not sufficiently supported by objec-
tive facts, and because of this lack of objective factual support, the
employees would naturally tend to take the statements as a threat.
In NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc.,3" the Board's finding of an
unfair labor practice was upheld. In that case the employer's general
manager made statements to the effect that if the union got in, there
would be a stricter policy concerning, inter alia, smoking, lateness,
layoffs, loans to employees, and coffee breaks (statements similar
29438 F.2d at 1107 (citing cases).
30340 U.S. 474 (1951).
31 ld. at 488.
32438 F.2d at 1109 (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 620). See also Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. at 479.
33 438 F.2d at 1109 (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488).
34 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 74
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to those made in Lenkurt). The court recognized that the Board
could regard such statements not as good faith predictions of what
was sincerely believed the company would be compelled to do in
the event of unionization, but rather as threats not rooted in any
business purpose designed to dissuade union support.
The Board's special competence was also upheld in NLRB v.
Tom Wood Pontiac, Inc. 5 Tom Wood's labor relations consultant
told one of the employees that he was pretty certain that the em-
ployees would "be out on the street by the first of January" if the
union won the organizational election.36 The Board decided that this
statement amounted to interference with, restraint, and coercion of
employees in their organizational effort in violation of the NLRA.
Enforcing the Board's order, the court held that the Board could
properly infer from the statement a threat of discharge if the union
won the election. This inference was found proper even though the
statement viewed in isolation could reasonably have been construed
as meaning that if the union won, it would pull the employees out on
strike. Since either inference was reasonable, the court stated it
could not reject the Board's inference of a threat by the company
"to throw employees out of work regardless of the economic realit-
ies.""
In NLRB v. Raytheon Co.," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
(which earlier had decided Lenkurt) recognized the Board's exper-
tise in this area and refused to say its conclusion was wrong, even
though the court experienced difficulty with the trial examinees
appraisal of the quality and impact of the employer's statements.
The Board had adopted the trial examiner's opinion that the employ-
er's statements exceeded the bounds of permissible predictions and
conveyed to its employees the distinct impression that economic
reprisal would follow a union victory. The court stated that an
employer during an organizational campaign who wishes to express
to his employees his views on unions or the consequences of unioni-
zation "must exercise extreme care not only in what he says but also
in gauging the import of what he says."39
35 447 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1971).
36 1d. at 385.
37 Id. (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 619).
38 445 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1971).
39 Id. at 273.
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Two differing conclusions arising out of strikingly similar em-
ployer expressions are found in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
and NLRB v. Aerovox Corp." In Central Hardware the employer's
vice president informed employees that they were receiving greater
benefits than those paid to employees in comparable unionized stores,
and that if employees were to select the union as their bargaining
representative, "all bets would be off" and bargaining would "start
from scratch." This speech was held not to constitute an unfair labor
practice because the speech viewed as a whole did not constitute a
threat of reprisal and there was no evidence that employees were
intimidated by it.
In Aerovox the employer sent a personal letter to each employee
which stated that the union could not guarantee that present benefits
would continue under a union contract, that bargaining "starts from
scratch," and that with a union, employees must be willing to accept
a serious possibility of a strike with all its hazards. This language
was held coercive and not protected. Taking into account the eco-
nomic dependence of employees on their employers, the court held
the Board might reasonably infer a threat arbitrarily to discontinue
present benefits including present wage scales. The Board also in-
ferred from the language a suggestion that Aerovox would surely
become an "unwilling employer" thus enhancing the prospect of a
strike.
In another recent decision,41 it was held that employer predic-
tions of unfavorable consequences resulting from unionization do not
exceed the bounds of permissible campaign tactics, so long as the
incidents referred to as the basis for the prediction are completely
truthful. In this case speeches by company officials referred to
incidents at other plants where unionization coincided with the dis-
ruption of the plants' traditionally friendly relations with their em-
ployees. The speeches were tempered, however, by statements that
the plants referred to did not close or lose business because of union
presence, but they closed because they were no longer able to operate
and compete effectively in the textile industry.
These federal court decisions had the benefit of the guidelines
established in Gissel. However, the apparent inconsistencies make
questionable the worth of the Gissel standards in supplying unifor-
39 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
40 435 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1970).
41 Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 74
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mity and certainty in the area of employer predictions. It often ap-
pears as though the difference between a threat and a prediction lies
in the employer's semantics. The problem is proving the intent of the
employer - by making a "prediction" of the consequences of union-
ization, does he intend to coerce or restrain the employees in the
exercise of their section 7 rights? In answering this primary ques-
tion, the Board and the courts still rely on the General Shoe "totality
of conduct" approach. It is well established that the language itself
cannot be evidence of an unfair labor practice, but the language may
be found to constitute a part of an illegal course of conduct, and thus
subject to regulation.
The employees have a legitimate interest in learning of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of unionization. It is therefore important
that both the union and employer be free to advise the employees of
all the factors which should be considered in reaching a rational
decision. However, it is recognized that the employer has a unique
relationship of economic dependence with his employees, and thus
must be most careful in both his selection of appropriate language
to convey his thoughts and the background in which such expressions
are made. If the employer's expressions or actions convey a meaning
to the employees that the employer will cause the adverse conditions
in the event of unionization, the protection of section 8(c) has been
exceeded and such "predictions" are not privileged.
Gissel established a stricter standard applicable to an employer's
prediction of precise effects he feels unionization will have on his
company. Such predictions "must be carefully phrased on the basis
of objective fact to convey a employer's belief as to demonstrably
probable consequences beyond his control.... 42
The apparent inconsistencies in recent federal decisions illu-
strate that perhaps in dealing with employer predictions it is not
possible to create precise guidelines of proper conduct. The contin-
ued application of the "totality of conduct" approach makes precision
difficult, but may provide the most equitable means of deciding these
cases. It must be remembered that during a pre-election campaign,
the determination of the employees' uninhibited desires is of utmost
importance.
Douglas Alan Cornelius
42 395 U.S. at 618 (emphasis added).
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